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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CARNICERO DYNASTY
CORPORATION, a corporation;
WENDELL L. BUTCHER; IRENE
B. BUTCHER; CHRIST L.
STANFIELD; JANIS B.
STANFIELD; BEN D. ISSAC;
and LILA O. ISSAC,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13836

APPELLANTS' RELIEF BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Suite by bonding company against alleged indemnitors who signed indemnity agreement after bond had
been issued.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court refused to dismiss for failure to prove
enforceable agreement or to permit amendment to conform to evidence re absence of consideration and awarded
judgment against alleged indemnitors for $44,600.00.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Order reversing judgment and dismissing case as
to defendants Butcher, or in the alternative, remanding the case for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Butchers incorporate herein by reference the statement of facts found on pages 2 thru 5 of their original
brief.
This reply brief is filed to correct grossly misleading
statements of alleged facts contained in plaintiff's brief.
Among other things, plaintiff would mislead the
Court into believing:
1. That plaintiff requested an indemnity agreement
from Butchers before it issued the bond to Carnicero.
(Plaintiffs brief pages 3-6, 9, 11, 17-21).
In fact Mills was not requested to obtain an indemnity agreement from Butcher until four months after
the bond had been issued to Carnicero. (Bond issued
Jan 6, 1969 — exhibit 3-P and he did not ask Butchers
to sign the indemnity agreement until May 7, 1969 —
exhibit 1-P). (R. 302-303; 375-380; 385-387)
2. That the bond was issued to Carnicero in consideration of an alleged agreement by Butchers to sign
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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an indemnity agreement.
10-13, 17-21)

(Plaintiff's brief pages 3-6,

The indemnity agreement required by plaintiff (Exhibit 2-P) was typed in plaintiff's Denver office, and included the typed names of the persons who were to sign
that indemnity agreement. (R. 375-380; 382; 384-387).
The Court summarized the testimony of plaintiff's
agent Mills (R. 375-376) as follows:
"THE COURT: Why did you wait until May to ask
Mr. Butcher to sign the Indemnity Agreement.
THE WITNESS (Mills): You will have to ask the
company that because I do what the company
ask me in regard to those items.
THE COURT: So from that, I take it, you went
out and got his signature (Butcher's) on that
Indemnity agreement in May of 1969 because
you were instructed to do so by your company?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Yes, sir."
At the conclusion of the trial the Court in summarizing the evidence concerning the Butchers' indemnity agreement stated as follows (R. 417):
". . . More than four months after the bond is
issued, . . . the insurance company as an obvious
afterthought, goes out through their agent Mills, and
he gets the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Butcher on
. . . an Indemnity Agreement. . . ."
It is clear from the foregoing that the bond was not
in fact issued in consideration of an agreement by ButDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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chers to sign an indemnity agreement as claimed by
plaintiff.
3. That the tardiness of plaintiffs agent Mills in
obtaining the signatures of Butchers was the reason that
the Butcher indemnity agreement was signed after plaintiff issued it's bond to Carnicero. (Plaintiff's brief page
18).
In fact Mills testified (as indicated in par # 2 above)
that plaintiff's Denver office determined who was to
sign the indemnity agreements and that he simply did
what he was told and obtained signatures of the persons
named by the Denver office. (R. 377-380; 382, 385-387).
He also testified that he was not requested to obtain the
signatures of Butchers on an indemnity agreement until
about four months after the bonds had been issued; that
he promptly obtained those signatures and returned the
Butcher indemnity agreements to the Denver office of
plaintiff. (R. 375-377, 417) There is absolutely no evidence in the record which even suggests that Mills was
tardy in obtaining signatures, or that the signatures of
Butchers were requested on a date earlier than the date
upon which they were obtained.
4. That the Court allegedly weighed
conflicting
testimony and allegedly chose to believe the alleged testimony of Mills that the indemnification agreement from
Butchers was requested and promised prior to the issuance of the bonds. (Plaintiffs brief pages 13 and 19).
As illustrated under paragraphs # 2 and # 3 above, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
court did not weigh conflicting testimony as to the time
when the Butcher indemnity agreement was first requested, but concluded in it's summarization of evidence
at the conclusion of the trial (quoted in paragraph # 2
above) (R. 417) that there was no promise by Butchers
to sign an indemnity agreement prior to the issuance of
the bonds. Also in its memorandum decision (denying
Butchers' motions to dismiss or to amend to conform to
the evidence) the Court (R. 147-149) did not find that
Butchers had promised to sign the indemnity agreement
prior to issuance of the bonds (as claimed by plaintiff
in it's brief). The Court's decision is based entirely upon
the failure of Butchers to plead lack of consideration in
their answer, and upon Butchers failure to amend their
answer to assert that defense during the four months
between the time when plaintiff furnished information
in answer to interrogatories (from which the availability of that defense could have been determined had
counsel for Butchers been more astute), and the trial
(R. 148-149). See Butchers original brief for discussion
of error in that court decision.
5. That the testimony quoted on pages 3-5 of plaintiffs brief supports plaintiffs
unfounded claim that
Butchers personally agreed to sign an indemnity agreement prior to issuance of the bonds.
Mills testimony, quoted in plaintiff's brief, relates to
Mills obtaining indemnity agreements before the bonds
were issued. Mills there testified that he requested the
indemnity agreement (from Stanfields and Isaacs) thru
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
Butcher prior to issuing the bonds. It is not disputed
that the request for indemnity agreements were made
through Butcher since he was the only person from Carnicero with whom Mills dealt (R. 370), however, the
request was for an indemnity agreement from the Stanfields (Butchers daughter and son-in-law) and Isaacs
(who were wholly unrelated to Butcher, contrary to
the claims of plaintiff on page 3 of brief), but no request
for an indemnity agreement was made of Butchers before the bonds were issued. It is interesting to note that
immediately following the language quoted by plaintiff
on page 4 of it's brief and relied upon by plaintiff to
support its claims, that the Court asked the questions
and received the answers quoted in paragraph #2 above
(Page 3) to the effect that the sole reason Mills obtained the signatures of Butchers in May, 1969, was
because it was requested at that time by plaintiff, which
wholly refutes plaintiff's claim that the language quoted
on page 4 of plaintiff's brief tends to prove an earlier
agreement by Butchers to sign an indemnity agreement.
The Butcher testimony, quoted on page 5 of plain
tiff's brief, apparently relies upon the use of the word
"we" by Butcher when discussing plaintiff's requirement that indemnity agreements be obtained. The quoted
testimony does not state that Butchers agreed to sign
an indemnity or explain who is meant by the word "we."
Butcher expressly stated in his testimony that when he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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said "we" he was referring to Carnicero. (R. 299). Since
plaintiff has obviously selected the testimony most favorable to it's claim that Butchers agreed to sign an indemnity agreement to induce plaintiff to furnish a bond to
Carnicero, and since the testimony selected by plaintiff
does not establish such an agreement, it is clear that
Butchers did not make such agreement.
6. That about four months after the bonds had been
delivered,

plaintiff

". . . insisted

that Mr. and

Butcher complete their agreement by signing the
nification and returning

it to the company."

Mrs.
indem-

(Plaintiff's

brief page 12).
The above-quoted gratuitous statement is not referenced to any testimony or evidence in the record
and in fact is not supported by the record. As demonstrated above (see paragraphs # 2 and 3 above and the
testimony of Mills there quoted) no such agreement
was ever made by Butchers and no claim was ever made
at the trial that Butchers were completing a prior agreement when they signed the indemnity agreement.
As indicated above, the undisputed testimony is that
some four months after the bonds were delivered, as an
obvious afterthought, plaintiff requested and received
an indemnity agreement from Butchers (without giving
consideration therefore).

(R.302-303; 376-379; 386-387;

417).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BUTCHERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff apparently agrees with the legal arguments
presented in Butchers' original brief since they have
not responded thereto, except to claim that those legal
principles are inapplicable because of plaintiff's unfoundded claim that the bond was issued in consideration of
an earlier promise by Butchers to sign an indemnity
agreement, (Point I of plaintiff's brief), and to claim
prejudice in responding to Butchers' defense of lack of
consideration (Point II of plaintiff's brief).
Plaintiff's brief acknowledges, in effect, that the
Butcher indemnity agreement is unenforceable unless
the bond was issued for Carnicero by plaintiff in reliance upon an agreement by Butchers to later sign such
an indemnity agreement, and is directed primarily at
establishing that the indemnity agreement need not be
signed before the bond is issued if the signer signs in
pursuance of his own previous promise to do so. (Plaintiff brief P. 15). We agree with that legal proposition,
however it has no application to the facts in this case
since (contrary to plaintiff's assertions in it's brief)
Butchers were not requested to sign an indemnity agreement and did not promise to do so prior to issuance
of the bond by plaintiff. See discussion under "Statement of Facts on pages 2 thru 7 of this brief.
Very simply stated then, the sole issue to be deterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mined by the Court under plaintiff's point I is whether
or not the evidence, when construed in the light most
favorable to the judgment, would justify a finding that
plaintiff issued it's bond in reliance upon a promise by
Butchers to execute an indemnity agreement. The Court
found that the evidence did not support such a finding
(R. 375-376; 417; 147-149). Also see discussion under
"Statement of Facts."
Further, it is nowhere asserted in plaintiff's brief
(or in the court record) that Mrs. Butcher promised
to execute an indemnity agreement to induce the
issuance of a bond. On the contrary, Mills testified
that Wendell Butcher was the only person with
whom he dealt concerning the indemnity agreements.
(R. 370). In it's brief plaintiff very cavalierly treats
both Mr. and Mrs. Butcher as if they were a single
person. Even if Wendell Butcher were liable under the
indemnity agreement (which we deny), no facts have
been alleged or proven which would impose liability
upon Mrs. Butcher.
POINT II

BUTCHERS FAILURE TO RAISE DEFENSE OF
LACK OF CONSIDERATION IN THEIR ANSWER
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEM FROM ASSERTING
THAT DEFENSE AT THE TRIAL AFTER PLAINTIFF ITSELF INTRODUCED EVIDENCE WHICH
MADE BUCHERS' COUNSEL AWARE OF THAT
DEFENSE
Much of the argument under point II of plaintiff's
brief is a rehash of plaintiff's unfounded assertion that
the bond was issued in reliance upon an alleged agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment by Butchers to sign an indemnity agreement. See
discussion under statement of facts and point I above.
In summary, plaintiff's second point asserts:
1. That lack of consideration is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, citing rule 8 (c), URCP,
Plaintiff has confused failure of consideration (which
is defense to previously enforceable contract, and must
be pleaded under rule 8 (c) URCP), with lack of consideration (where no valid contract ever existed and
which can be raised for the first time at the trial as
provided by Rule 41 (b), URCP). See discussion on
pages 8-16 of Butchers original brief herein.
2. That plaintiff was prejudiced in meeting that
defense at the trial by Butchers not amending their
answer to assert that defense, when plaintiffs answers
to interrogatories supplied facts from which availability
of that defense could have been learned. Plaintiff has
failed to point to any witness or evidence which it might
have presented at the trial had Butchers asserted the
defense four months earlier when plaintiff finally answered Butchers' interrogatories (over a year late).
At the most plaintiff has speculated that since a person
who formerly worked at plaintiff's bonding department
was not available for the trial because he no longer
worked for plaintiff, his testimony might have been
favorable to plaintiff. No proffer of proof was made as
to what evidence that person might have presented had
he been called, or as to how it might have affected the
trial of the past consideration issue. (Plaintiff's brief
P. 21). Mills testified that several different people
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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worked on this bond, and that since plaintiff's Denver
office retained copies of everything he did not keep his
files even though he knew that a dispute had arisen
concerning the bond. (R. 382, 384). There is no claim
by plaintiff that the destroyed files of Mills would have
oeen available for the trial had Butchers asserted the
past consideration defense four months earlier (Mills
only retained his files for three years — R. 383), or
that the former employee of plaintiff would have been
available for trial or would have been able to give helpful testimony on the vital question of past consideration
had that defense been raised four months earlier. Under
Rule 15(b), URCP, the burden was upon plaintiff to
satisfy the court that the admission of evidence concerning past consideration would prejudice plaintiff in maintaining his action on the merits. Plaintiff not only failed
to object to the admission of that evidence, but plaintiff itself introduced that evidence. Rule 15(b), URCP,
further provides that the Court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence. Plaintiff did not move for a continuance
to permit it to locate additional files or witnesses, but
chose to stand on the record before the Court. A determination of the case on its merits within the meaning
of Rule 15(b), URCP, requires a determination that
Butchers were never legally bound to indemnify plaintiff because the Butcher indemnity agreement was not
supported by any consideration.
Plaintiff claim that the 5% year delay in bringing
this matter to trial created prejudice which precludes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Butchers from then asserting the absence of consideration defense. As indicated on page 18 of Butchers'
original brief, that delay resulted from plaintiff's failure
to answer Butchers' interrogatories, which resulted in
cancellation of four separate trial dates. (P. 19 of Butchers' brief). Plaintiff argues that the last cancellation
was at the request of Butchers' counsel. (Plaintiff's
brief P. 9-10). It is true that Butchers' counsel moved
for a continuance of the trial scheduled Jan. 23, 1974,
because plaintiff had finally filed it's answers to Butchers' interrogatories (after a delay of over a year in
answering) on January 17, 1974, only five days before
the scheduled trial date, leaving insufficient time to
review the 28 page answer and to prepare for trial.
Plaintiff cannot now blame Butchers for it's delay in
bringing this matter to trial and then take advantage
of it's own delay, so as to prejudice Butchers in asserting an absolute defense to plaintiff's claim, since
Butchers first became aware of that defense when
plaintiff introduced the bond and the indemnity
agreement into evidence at the trial.
Plaintiff has simply not shown facts which would
justify the court's refusal to permit Butchers to assert
the defense of lack of consideration at the trial. See also
discussion on pages 16-20 of Butchers original brief
herein. The decision of the Court refusing to permit
Butchers to assert the defense of past consideration is
in error and should be reversed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
Butchers' indemnity agreement is unenforceable for
lack of consideration, having been executed for months
after the bonds were issued by plaintiff. Plaintiff's
unfounded claim that the bonds were issued by plaintiff in reliance upon an alleged oral agreement by Butchers to later sign an indemnity agreement is contrary
to the undisputed evidence, including the testimony of
plaintiff's agent Mills, who negotiated for the bonds.
Plaintiff's claim that Butchers should be precluded
from asserting that they never were liable to plaintiff
under the indemnity agreements, due to lack of consideration, because Butchers didn't plead that defense in
their answer. Butchers did not discover the availibility
of that defense until plaintiff introduced the bond and
indemnity agreement at the trial. Plaintiff claims that
it was prejudiced in responding to that defense by the
delay in asserting the defense, but failed to request a
continuance in order to meet that defense as contemplated by Rule 15(b), URCP, and failed to point to or
to make a proffer of evidence which it could have produced had Butchers discovered that defense and moved
to amend their answer some four months earlier when
plaintiffs answers to interrogatories disclosed dates from
which the availability of that defense might have been
learned. At most plaintiff has only speculated that eviDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence favorable to plaintiff might have been available
had it learned of the absence of consideration defense
four months earlier. As an expert in the bonding business surely plaintiff was always aware that the Butchers
indemnity agreement was not enforceable.
The evidence before the court establishes conclusively that Butchers (and particularly Mrs. Butcher)
were never asked to sign an indemnity agreement until
some four months after plaintiff delivered it's bonds
without requesting or requiring an agreement to give
an indemnity agreement from Butchers. Acordingly,
the judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed
as to Butchers, or should be remanded for a new trial
on the issue of whether or not Butchers made an oral
promise to sign an indemnity agreement to induce plaintiff to execute it's bond for the defendant Carnicero.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 486-9636
Attorney for
Defendants-Appellants
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